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SYSTEMS SIMULATION AND ITS
 
APPLTCATION IN THE KASS APPROACH
 
by 
Glenn L. Johnson*
 
One of the first things to do in addressing people interested in using 
results of simulation researci to help solve agricultural development problems 
is to answer the qt'e ion, ',,hat is simulontio?" Even if this were a speech 
to professional simulator;- it would be nece sary to indicate the specific meaning 
which I want to attach to the word because there are many, many different types 
of simulators, each Lypc calling a sonewhat diffi rent thing simulation. 
I am going to talk about "generalized, computerized, systems-scienlce"
 
simulation. Such sJ.mulations are general because they are not specialized with
 
respect to type or source of data, technique, discipline, cr philosophy. They
 
are adapted to utilize modern, high-speed, electronic computers and, hence,
 
can be referred to as computerized. They also deal with the structure of systems
 
and the activities which go on within such systems; hence, the approach of
 
systems scientists is advantageous and simulations involving their work can be
 
referred to as systems science simulations. Though systems scientists made their
 
name in the aerospace industry originally, the systems science approach is
 
applicable to any system including environmental or ecological systems; economic,
 
social and political systems; and, of course, agricultural systems.
 
*Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University,
 
East Lansing, Michigan.
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Having discussed briefly the meaning of the adjective "generalized,"
 
nd scomputerized"science," remains-. it to discuss the meaning
 
of simulatlon as a noun .
 The word is used here to stand for a representation of a real
 
world i ystem is c:.,i;able of tracing the 6vOluLion of the systez and activities
 
generated vithln ust'.cm ti._,. two are
that through The essentials that the 
systcm repr.,ient or be thought to represent at least some aspects of a real
 
world .!,stem a,d thit it bte cq:t,6.le of operating through time. Examples include
 
ship testiag b:itais anid 1J~,L plents as well. aa mathen:tilca representations of 
such cSFr,|.f,-,g s;tan. 0 V -"ce programs, hozipitals and agricultural sectors. 
ffudL:.J c-,nal) b r.-,,i i Tngli).i rsthl LI'Zi:. in tianha..,atics and, as such,
 
cnn be J1.pu. !-1: 2 r -:-ri c 16 htekn
-. anrr.,jints of time and through 
tIn.. Thrt iJ..* Lit COL L: IUI! viat are to be dicuise-i herein represent systems 
from the rcul.world in trfs of equations capable of being put on computers. 
Why Simulate?
 
When one is asked 
the qucstion, "Why simulate?" the experienced simulator 
is likely to atnwt-er, "boacatse real world decisions concerning practical problems 
are almost always based tipon knov,ledge concerning: (1) the structural nature of 
an existing or newly ducigned system about which a decision is being made and 
(2) how tha't vysttem woli]d operate through time." 
 This answer is true historically
 
as well as currently and will continue to be true for the indefinite future.
 
Such an answer indicates that simulation is not a new thing dependent upon
 
recent advances in computer technology. The answer recognized that down through
 
the ages it has been important for military leaders, kings, presidents, ministers
 
and legislators to understand the structure of the systems they are trying to
 
modify and to envision how the system's behavior would be affected by their
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decisions. 
Even before the advent of the written word, it is likely that the ramily.
 
governmental, and military decision-makers who attained the greatest successes were
 
those who did a superior job of envisioning the system in which they existed
 
including how it would operate through time if various modifications were made
 
in it. In Korea, Admiral Lee, Soon Sinn must have been a superior simulator
 
to attain his great victory over the Japanese fleet.
 
My own early experiences as an agricultural economist includea period
 
of pre-computer research In the Statistical Service Section of the Division
 
of Historical and Srttistical Research of the old Bureau of Agricultural
 
Economics in the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The section served admin­
istrators from the executi've branch and senators and congressmen from the legislative
 
branch of the U.S. Governrment. it was conti:ually engaged In developing statistical
 
pictures of the structure and nature of the U. S. agricultjrpl economy or of some
 
part thereof which was particularly relevant 
to then current problems and issues
 
before administrative and legislative decision makers. 
As a young, Number 10,
 
Junior professonal.assistant in the Department of Agriculture Civil Service,
 
I 
was asked repeatedly to make projections concerning the consequences through
 
time of alternativo legislative and administrative actions. 
At that time,
 
econometricians had not yet developed the simultaneous equations technique of
 
estimating the parameters of sets of simultaneous equations; hence, the
 
specialized simultaneous econonetric equations of the Cowles Commission
 
variety were not used. Also, as linear programming had not yet been 
developed, specialized single.-period, static and multi-period dynamic 
and recursive linear programming were employed.not However, both 
mathematical and graphic correlation techniques employedwere on occasion 
while a great variety of economic, political, technological, sociological 
and administrative concepts and theories were used. A great diversity of
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infornation was mobilized from "situation report writers" who had
 
responsibility for accumulating 
 various kinds of information from many 
sources concerning various commodity and subject matter areas. 
 Supplemental
 
information was obtaince from lawyers, farmers, old mail order catalogues, 
agronomists, animal husbandrymen, business men, s"riologists, demographers,
 
government administrators, congressmen, etc. 
This information was assembled
 
on an ad hoc, flexible, seat-of-the-pants basis into a picture of
 
"the situation" relevant to the problem at hand. Projections were also 
developed for altcrntti'.'e po].i2y, and designs.rogram project These 
projection.s tre d" ,., ]i;croui]:,bi - fiL.xibly, '4th paper, pencil, 
desk calculator a:u ih -. il a reas.-nable picture was obtained of howA&& 
the existiig sy-,:cmi 1 iked, orerzted and .ould be modified by the le-i7lative 
and adrini';trari.,e ptiposals u z cc:i'r... 
.,, L... a 
great deal of interaction between the people making the projections and 
the decision makers. For a person as junior ag I was at that time, the
 
interaction with senators, 
 congressmen, and government administrators was 
often with my supervisors rather than directly with m-e though it was not too 
long before it was clear that administrative and legislative decision makers 
wanted to talk directly to the person making the, projections. Oftentimes 
the decision makers did not like the projected consequences of their own 
proposals and wanted to develop still other alternatives. In doing this, 
they wanted to talk to persons more capable than they were of describing 
the existing situation and of envisioning the consequences of their
 
alternativesthrough time; hence, they sought direct contact. 
 And, I as the 
person making the projections found such interaction an important source of 
iLnformation.
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The interactivc process which was just described is far from unique; 
instead, it is characteristic of real world decision making, both public and 
private. Essentially, it is a staff/decision-maker relationship usually 
found between staff and dcision makers in the military as well as in other 
administrative branches of th;e government and between legislative staff 
members and legislatorz. lt is also the sort of working relationship which 
exists in bisinesJes between decision makers and their staff. This interaction
 
is crucial for t, sucet of both .nvc.-ti-ator and staff. With interaction 
more infi r, a io , ,:,':" .Yc t., iii' StLg :,. rd st-iff and is used; without 
it some infrr:ticu ±, !.y to bI ;,'a, ted. .itn interaction, the projections 
take on credibility Vi h dccis!on nakers 'E-catre thiy have an opportunity to 
supply ideas, information and to understard the projections; without interaction 
decision makers are luft uninformed, deprived of opportunity to contribute 
valuable ideas, 'nd have suspicions of the results produced by their investigators. 
One of the disadvantages of paper and pencil, seat-of-the-pants, ad hoc 
projections is their htgl. cost. They require larg.e inputs of expensive professional 
time and the slowness wI Lt which comi)utatiotls can be made make it difficult to 
make projections for more than a few alternatives at a few points in time. 
In the 40's -:. 5's, taere was a period of tine in which considerable 
math imatical and .aListical progress was made with respect to very 
specialized techni,uea. One "leap forward" cane at the Cowles Commission 
at the University of Chicago woere tue technique of making probability estintes 
for parameters of syntems of simultaneous equations was developed. At the time 
this developmint was taking place, there was a great deal of hope that it would 
make the informal ',;Ind; of projections described above much more accurate 
and hence more effective; however, the technique did not live up to its 
promise. Retrospectively, the difficulty seems to be that the technique 
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of making probabilistic es;timates of the parameters of simultaneous equations
 
was: (1) unduly speciLli;:ed on sources and kinds of data; (2) dealt only
 
with linear re].ati: I p? 't.eu non-linear ones should be used; and (3) often 
assumed maxinizing behavior on tae part of procu.:ers and consumers who 
have not yet "sorted thing-, out" will enough to maximize. Primarily time
 
series and, in some instanc~s, cross-sectional data were.used. 
It was difficult to 
incorporate experimental (ca and prior information to which probabilities
 
could not be as,,;,.! a r:, c ,r o 
contained in the judgments of Administrntors
 
and experlen.ed p..:
 
Another deveV.:j.:! h,: ,c ,!o with linear prowrning which has also 
been computerized. !.'at.at iro,,r. rr.ing .oZpIt.tiJor.s are maximizing computations 
and require the selection of a slngle objective tc 'e ,axf.mized. After its 
initial development, lirear progr,&I,'!.r, ,
was extended so that programs could be 
run recursively and, hen:e, used a6 specialized simulation models. 
As linear programrn.ig models must maximize something, they,like the systems 
of simultaneous equiti:n3 developcd by econor-etricians, are of limited usefulness 
in exploring the structUrc or syste11 and the behavior of persons and organizations
 
not yet able to determine what to maximize. Simultaneous equations and linear
 
programming projections have riot achieved the wide acceptability of seat-of-the­
pants projections among decision makers and important credibility gaps have
 
developed for these techniques. 
 These gaps have not been easily bridged by
 
interactions between investigators and decision makers for a number of reasons$
 
Included in these reasons are the complexity of these estimation techniques, the
 
the narrow range of information used by inventigators who often ignore
 
information readily available to decision makers, the obvious premature or in­
appropriate uses of maximization, and the exclusion of the creative and
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inventive ideas of decision makers. 
The unfavorable experiences of decision
 
makers and administrators with projections produced by such highly specialized
 
techniques have produced a suspicion of all computerized sophisticated estimate
 
and a tendency to prefer common-sense, more understandable, broader based, less
 
specialized projections.
 
As more specialized approaches such as simultaneous equations and the
 
linear programming tucilmiques have less flexibility than the old paper and
 
pencil, scat-of-cne-.aints 
 projections, there is a need to maintain
 
flexibility in :nodelin,; th:e 
 structures and operations of real world systems.
 
.Generalized6, 
 ,cc:h',ut ri/'cu, syU;cs-&cience siuilation models have been
 
successful in maitaii in? 
 the flt. ii'lity of the seat-of-the-pants projections
 
while expoboiinl the computational efficiency 
 of the modern electronic
 
computer and 
 utilizing such specialized tecl.niques as linear progra.ming and 
econometric estinaticn of parameters of simultaneous equations; thus, part
 
of the answer to the question of "Why simulate?" is that simulation can
 
maintain tqe flexibility of 
 the more creditable traditional seat-of-the-pants 
projections with respect to sources of data, kinds of information, 
disciplines and specific techniques without being constrained to specific types
 
and sources of information, specialized techniques, or a single philosophic
 
point of view. Furthermore, simulation can deal with multiple objectives without
 
necessarily maximizing or assuming maximization behavior. 
Like the old seat­
of-the-pants projections, simulation can permit creative, inventive, and
 
original interactions with decision makers. 
At thir point, it is worthwhile to illustrate the decrease in costs
 
which has been made possible by the use of systems science 
 techniques and
 
electronic computers in making projections. 
Neither systems science techniques
 
nor the computer reduce the flexibility of the old seat-of-theipants approach
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yet, together, they greatly reduce costs for a given system of any important
 
degree of complexity. 
This can be illustrated from experiences in carrying
 
out agricultural sector analyses of the development problems of two countries--

Nigeria and Kcrca. Using seat-of-the-pants traditional projections for Nigeria, 
an inter-university team expended 30 professional man-years of time 
constructing projections for three main policy alternatives at three points 
in time for Nigerian ngriculture.I / 
 In this connection, it was necessary
 
to amass a great deal of information about the Nigerian agricultural
 
situation. The project took three years. 
 It was expensive. It did attain 
acceptability. The :;iuerL ,d, the final rei)ort clong with an earlier 
report from FAO on Nij;2rian agricu-'ure as the two basic resource documents 
for a six month agricultural development plonnin. exercise and seminar. This 
planning exercise and seminar became the basis for the "percpective" agricul­
tural development plan which is the basic input concerning agriculture into the
 
development of Nigeria's next five-year plan. 
The high cost of making these
 
seat-of-the-pants projections was impressive; 
as a result of these high costs,
 
steps were taken to investigate the possiblity of using the generalized
 
computerized systems-science, simulation approach. 
At a national conference of
 
persons informed concerning this approach, it
was concluded that the necessary
 
software had not yet been developed. Fortunately, the Agency for Internation­
al Development contracted with Michigan State University to proceed to
 
develop such softwara with the hope that the cost of doing subsequent sector
 
analyses could be greatly reduced. 
 Subsequently, it costs 
 about one-fifth
 
of what the Nigerian study cost to develop the necessary software to model the
 
I/Johnson, Glenn L., g.,
et a 
 "Strategies and Recommendations for Nigerian
Rural Development 199/1935," Consortium for the Study of Nigerian RuralDevelopment, July, 1969.
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Nigerian economy. 11 This software was developed by the time the Nigerian 
Agricultural Development Seminar was held. In connection with that seminaz
 
simulations were run for 17 policy alternatives by years for twenty years
 
into the future at a cost of less than 2 percent of what the original seat-of­
the-pants projections cost for these alceinaives at three points in time.
 
Shortly after this, The Korean Agricultural Sector Study was done.
 
Many of the software compoa,.-,ts developed for Nigeria were directly trans­
ferable to Korea. 1'he -mainproblem 'as to quickly amass a description of tie 
current Korean LiCiOtioU. This w,3 dout't'ilizlng the 3ervices of about 40 
persons wno r.:.) prtic ILriy orieate,, to svst# ,1-cience simulation 
model1:.,. iio'.c,:ur, tile sys;te's Scientists and apricultural economists 
involvcd who ,er. L .;nred trs-ards such sin.uiaticn modeling used their 
knowledge of such nodels ana modeling techniques to guide the activity of 
the 40 or more non-si=ulators who participated in the Korean study. This
 
greatly increased the efficiency with which observations were made on the 
existing economy. Further, the simulators were able to build that informa­
tion quickly into matiematical equations which could be placed on the
 
computer. This meant that the 'Korean group, unlike the Nigerian group, did 
not have to spend large amounts of very expensive professional time carrying
 
out paper and pencil and desk calculator computations. The upshot of it
 
was that the Korean's agricultural sector study document reached first draft 
stage within 7 months rather than 36 months at a cost of approximately one­
fourth the cost of the Nigerian study. Still further, the Korean model
 
-/Manetsch, Thomas J., et al., A Generalized Simulatlon Approach to Agricultural 
Sector __Is, Consortium for the Study of Nigerian Rural Development, 
November, 1971. 
2./Ross:niller, G. E., et al., Korean Agricultural Sector Analysis and 
Reco.m_ended Developrment Strategies 1971-1945, Korean Agricultural Sector 
Study Team, 1972. 
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was much more comprehensive and dealt with many more policy alternatives in
 
much more detail than the original seat-of-the-pants projections for Nigeria.
 
Clearly, there has been a substantial -eduction in costs of making projections
 
without losing the flexibility and credibility of the old seat-of-the-pants
 
traditional projections.
 
Incidentally, it must be stressed that the generalized, systems-science 
simulation approacih i!; not o z co;:ipired with such specialized techniques as 
linear p ograrining, siI.ult'i:cOus econometric equations, cost/betiefit analysis, 
input-outpuj .atwl-,;, ec. it i, not a milizd technique; instead, it 
is an approach. AS an agipr:ach, it utilizes any orz of such specialized 
techniques if it 1 i . Ae t., ;.c then. In utilizing such a techniqu-, 
the approach could ,,.-,trate e. irely upon *:;e technd,.ue or mcrely use it 
to model some small co-.poneat of the system being modeled. in many instances, 
the investigation reveals that it is not advantageous to utilize certain 
specialized techniques such as linear programming, simultaneous econometric
 
equations or cost benefit computations.
 
What System Should be Simulated? 
The building of a simulation model is like the building of, say, a 
working model of a ship or airplane. One does not set out to model in the 
abstract; instead, one models sozme thing. The system involved in the solution 
of the practical problem of concern is modeled in practical, problem-solving 
work. 
The Korean Agricultural Sector Study (KASS) approach to the study of Korea's
 
agtlcultural sector was practical and intended to assist in reaching prescriptions
 
for solving Korea's agricultural development problems. KASS viewed its task
 
as one of developing as much of the necessary information for making prescriptions
 
as feasible within its resource limits. Included in the sources of information
 
wera dpe--alon makers from the Republic of Korea Government (ROKG); the United
 
States Agency for International Development, Korea (USAID/K); the'Agencyfor
 
International Development, Washington (AID/W) and from grantor, donor and lender
 
agencies. The prescriptions reached in this study were not exclusively those
 
of KASS, but were, instead, partially the outgrowth of interactions with relevant
 
decision makers.
 
Reaching prescriptive conclusions to solve agricultural development problems
 
required development of a picture of the Korean situation and of the desires and
 
dislikes of Koreans.
 
The Problem-Solving Process
 
The problem,-solvlng proccss, 
as diagramied in Figure 1, includes six steps
 
which all draw or. and produce knowledge of both 
the Korean situation and of
 
Korean likes and dislikes. Development problems of an 
agricultural sector grow
 
out of changes or 
the lack of changes in its environment, mainly with respect to
 
technology, institubons, and people. 
Acquiring knowledge about such changes
 
requires the efforts of a wide variety of specialists such as 
technical scientists,
 
political scientists, sociologists, psychologists and educators, statisticians,
 
and students of business administration. 
 The plant breeder, not the economist,
 
is central to the solution of a problem that requires new plant varieties.
 
Similarly, agronomists, chemists and biologists create new fertilizers, herbicides
 
and pesticides; chemists, physicists, engineers, and designers create nonagricul­
tural technologies; educators change people; and politicians and political
 
scientists create new political institutions.
 
As Figure 1 indicates, both normative and nonnormative information
 
are used in all steps of the problem-solving processes. 
A problem can­
not be defined without normative concepts of goodness and badness as well
 
as concepts about the current situation and how the system under study are
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Normative Problem Non-normativ 
Concepts of Definition Concepts 
Good and [,a. 
Observation 
Anallysis 
goal-, and acts 
Action 
Responsibility 
Bearing 
FIGURE 1. Six steps in a problem-solvinrj procus;. (Source: Adapted from A Study 
of Managerial Processes of Alidwostur' Farmers,Johnson, G. L., Halter, A. H., Jensen, H. 
R., Thomas, D. W., erJs., Iowa Stat., Uiiv,.'rsily Presi, Ames, Iowa. 1961. Sev also "The 
Role of the University in Economic DJvr:loprnenl," .. S. McLean Visiting Professor 
Lecture, Dept. of Ag. Ecun., University of Guelph, Publication No. A[ 70/2, March 23, 
1970.) 
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related. Normative concepts indicate what is important and, hence, what kinds
 
of nonnormative information should be observed and analyzed. The decision rules
 
followed by decision nalters utilize both normative and non-normative information
 
to indicate which set of goals would, if attained through appropriate action,
 
best "maximize Korean interests and purposes..." Action is, of course, oriented
 
towards attaining the goals or targets judged by decision makers to be worthwhile,
 
all things both normative and nonnormative considered. Responsibility bearing is, 
of course, both normative and ronnormatlve. The decision maker is responsible 
for the bad as w&.ll i. t',,a -,od c.ln-,tquenss. 
Noneconomist;s and n.qcait '-;2:getful economists need to be told that economics 
does, in fact, deal w, the att >:.2nt of nonmonetary values, and that treating 
nonmonetary values as noneconoiIc is a serlo"- error which result in elimination 
of consumption and welfare economics from the discipline of Cconomics! It is 
hard to conceive of a single value about which questions of efficiency do not 
arise when trying to attain the value (if it is a good) or to avoid it (if it is 
a bad). Further, it is even harder to think of purely economic or purely social 
values; attainment of the so-called economic values is attended by social con­
sequences, and conversely, as noted, there are economic questions of efficiency 
involved in attaining or avoiding the so-called social values. In effect, the
 
dichotomy of economic and social values appears to be false.
 
Many of the problems 6f economic development do not meet the requirements
 
for applying the simple cplculus of economics in making decisions. The order
 
in which actions are taken is often of crucial importance, yet the best order
 
is not obvious. This is especially true where the problem involves invention and
 
creation of new technolog!es, institutions and new kinds of people (through educa­
tion and motivation, for instance). Also, it is difficult to find appropriate
 
conucon denominators when trying to subtract the badness of, say, higher rice
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pric.es for poor urban dwellers from the goodness of greater national rice self­
sufficiency. When a problem involves several individuals (as in a family,
 
community or nation), the common denominator must have interpersonal validity if
 
the calculus is to be applied. The remaining complication arises from imperfect
 
knowledge. When outcomes of actions are uncertain, the "right" action is not
 
always defined as the one expected to maximize the difference between good and
 
bad. Instead, do decision makers, for instance, appropriately do that for which
 
the worst that could h:ppen is better than the worcit for any other possible 
action? Or do they"..:.inize the avcragt .xpccrt2 dlffero.h,:e? Or satisfice or 
flip a coin? Or fi:ht cr go tu war to settle the question, especially if they 
are having troble fn-jing an i-'.-,-;rsonally valid common denominator? 
KASS investig t c- recognize that these diff'cultieq would t'e encountered 
in attempting to solve the dev2lopment problems of Korean agriculture. Like
 
other problem-solvn., teams before them, KASS workers sought to handle these 
difficulties by studying both the structure of the agricultural sector and its
 
problems to acquire an understanding of how the agricultural economy operates.
 
However, unlike many other teams before them in many other countries, they also
 
attempted to develop an efficient computerized capacity to project the consequen­
ces of prescribing alternative solutions to the problems of Korean agricultural
 
development.
 
KASS Approach
 
The broad general development problem of Korean agriculture is made up of
 
literally, thousands of problems and sub-problems. Korea has a problem of attain­
ing increased food production, in general and for specific crops; it also has a
 
problem of high urban food prices and of low incomes to its farmers. The
 
Korean diet is not adequate; more protein is needed, particularly meat, poultry
 
products, fish, and dairy products. There is also a problem of population
 
aontrol. There is an income distribution problem within agriculture, within tie
 
irban sector, and between the two sectors. This income distribution problem
 
ilso shows up regionally within the country. There is a problem of developing
 
(orea's water resources and of controlling their use as well as of developing
 
)addy and uplands. There are administrative problems in the agricultural estab­
lishment which interfere with the capacity of the Korean government to assist
 
its agriculture. Farm labor problems are numerous, both for the farm entie­
preneurs experieUIncg labor shortazes and for laborers who find their earnings
 
lower than those iLI Korea's rapidly develop!nng industry. Korean farms are small 
and so fragmented chat fe-.' petile own enough land to produce incomes comparable 
to those emerging for people in ILI,? nonfrarm sector. There is the problem )f the 
low social stitus attached to agriculture and to farmers. There is a need to
 
decentralize industry into rural areas. Korea's food marke~s are in need of
 
modernization and rapid expansion; m:irkets for modern sectors of production for
 
agriculture are not well developed and function poorly. Economic intelligence
 
available to the private agricultural sector and to the Korean government is
 
inadequate.
 
Basic to solving the multiplicity of problems was the need to simplify the
 
analysis and acquire an understanding of how Korean agriculture operates. The
 
list of problems cited above could be expanded almost without limit, but it is
 
already long enough to indica'te that KASS could not tackle all the individual
 
problems encountered in Korea's developiihg agricultural economy. Ways had to be
 
found to economize on the time and resources of researchers assigned to the study.
 
The need to simplify the list of problems was closely related to the need
 
to acquire an understanding of how Korea's agricultural sector operates, both
 
internally and with respect to the other sectors of the economy. This under­
standing had to be relevant in the sense that it told how the agricultural sector
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would respond to policies and programs and, for chat matter, projects designed
 
to handle problems such as listed above. Korea's agricultural development
 
problems were examined in enough detail to set up three broad alternative ways
 
of 	organizing Korean agriculture to (1) simplify the analysis, and (2) acquire
 
an understanding of how the Korean agricultural sector is put together, how it
 
operates as now organized, and how it would operate if it were reorganized to
 
follow alternative policies and progranm. Thus, KASS has studied the three
 
broad policy strategy alternatives for Korean agriculture which can be described
 
briefly as:
 
1. 	Continuation ot thc agric-iltural policies dnd rural development 
strategies lai-l d-. in Korea's Third Five-Year Plan (TFYP), 
2. 	 Modification( cf tie ,fYP includin., hl-I icr :trtricul tural product 
and cons;i::.. r 1';:'d r( -.1 ;-iciec1aL,"iningr1j ,:n(d Incro.,. 	 in 
national uura w'-ircu,ual:; through shiftfU; in, pciicy priorities 
arnd 	 progra:,1 er'ias from that plan, and 
3. 	A policy strategy alternative involving greater Korean reliance
 
on international sources of agri-ultural products and on the
 
domestic market iachanism.
 
By concentrating on questions concerning the empirical consequences of
 
following these three broad alternatives over the 1970 to 1985 period, the
 
KASS team has been able to acquire considerable empirical understanding of how
 
Korea's agricultural sector works. This deeper understanding is relevant to
 
analyzing and solving the kinds of detailed problems taken into account in
 
setting up the three broad alternative policy strategy sets.
 
Working Papers
 
After defining each of the three alternative ways of operating Korean
 
agriculture the.KASS team raised questions as to what data and what subjects
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would have to be investigated in order to understand how Korean agriculture would
 
operate uAder each of the three alternatives. Over twenty working parties were
 
established and workitig papers produced.' Each working party included a special­
ist in each particular subject from Michigan State University and one, two or
 
even three Korean experts in the same subject Patter. The working papers dealt
 
with such subjects as crop and livestock production, upland development, credit,
 
the National Agrlcu.Lural '.NraLi;c; Federation (NACF), water resources,
 
price incom:e and ;tu1:9idy y: i~io, rosearch and technological advance, extension,
 
rural insL'tuti)r.t a:! inff.-i ructure, administrative processes, population, 
capital forriiticn, e.-,,lo--cnt !arj -nAration,and nutrition. In several instances, 
the working paputr tnf d':ee tnformal projections based on a wide variety 
of data, information sources, and jud;.ients. Later these projections were used 
as inputs in the more formal simulation model which was handled on a computer. 
Recognizing that information and skills from disciplines was required, the groups
 
assigned to produce working papers included a sociologist, another trained in publii 
administration, an ex:easion personnel specialist, an industrial psychologist, 
an animal husbandryi,:an, and an experiment station director as well as agricultural 
economists and systems scientists accustomed to working with a wide range of 
information about technical, institutional and human change. The importance
 
of these working parties and papers in the KASS approach cannot be overemphasized.
 
While the various working papers were being produced, another group started
 
the process of iu,.eling the operation of the Korean agricultural economy.
 
Michigan State University personnel, operating under AID/csd contract 2975, were
 
available to transfer to the Korean modal components which previously had been
 
developed for work in Nigeria and Brazil.
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There was constant MSU-Korean interaction between people writing the work­
ing rapers and tho3e designing the model. Information revealed by the working
 
parties in each working paper changed the ziodel and the model, in its turn, was
 
the source of questions addressed to the various working parties. 
 The many­
faceced process of examining Korean agricultural development problems, defining
 
those problems, establishin working parties and working papers, and of model­
ing the Korean agricultural cconomy was continuous, with steady feedback and
 
reformulation as the project procecded. 
 Figure 2 diagrams the model development
 
process and, as 
su:h, ii clcsely related to the general problem-solving process
 
diagrammed litFigure 1. 
KASS personnel wanted a model of the Korean agricultural economy which would
 
permit estimation of the consequences through time of following, not only the
 
three policy strategy sets defined, but other alternatives as weli. Because
 
the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (AERI), the most directly involved
 
Korean agency, has direct long-term responsibilities for economic research on
 
Korea's agricultural sector, a model was designed to be 
(1) capable of handling
 
a broad range of future policy alternatives, and (2) specific and relevant
 
enough to the Korean situation to handle the three policy strategies in a manner
 
directly related to Korea's agricultural development problems and her experiences
 
with the TFYP.
 
To project the consequences through time of following the three alternative
 
policy strategy sets, the model had to handle a set of variableswhich could be
 
manipulated by analysts to correspond to each of the policy strategy sets.
 
These policy variables are designatcdVin Figure 3. Figure 3 gives the reader
 
a quick graphic view of the whole model developed by KASS. At the top of the
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FIGURE 3. Koredn ,.gficultural sector analysis: majo,sub-svto. ihinw,outputs, and policy inputs. 
diagram are tour major components of the model: (1) agricultural production and
 
consumption, (2) agricultural product marketing, (3) urban consumption, and
 
(4)nonagricultural production reached via an abbreviated version of the Korean
 
National input/output table. 'Coredetail concerning the agricultural sector
 
is provided by other major components dealing with agricultural input markets,
 
public agricultural development programs, public administration, the national
 
budget, and internaticnal Wrr.,.While
the entire model shown in Figure 3 was 
not yet dcvelbped hi! ti, rerort was written, the diagram repreaents what the 
KASS group hopes to develc-, in Phase wce of its work. The strict time limitation 
imposed on this r-purz. by zihc contract betwei.cn M!chigan State University (MSU), 
the Republic of Kore a G)veni.ment (ROKC) and the United States Agency for Inter­
na.tional Developr.tLt (UAID) .mdae it necessary to work with an abbreviated ver­
sion of the model which eventually will be constructed. TLa model is represented 
by Figure 4. Special attention should be called to different parts of Figure 4
 
to help the reader see that the model used by KASS is really a "man and computer"
 
rather than Just a "computer" model. The "man" components which are enclosed 
in dashed lines in Figure 4, include: (1) yield projections, (2) resource alloca­
tions, and (3) price adjustment. In each of these three instances, projections
 
were developed for 1980 and 1985 on an informal basis usin-1 paper and pencil or
 
desk calculators and drawing on a wide variety of data and sources of information
 
These "man-made" projections become inputs into the computerized components of
 
the model. Tables 2, 3 and 4 contain some of the man-made projections with
 
respect to yields, resource allocations and prices.
 
Specific components developed to help prepare the projections for the
 
sector analysis include:
 
1. 	Sub-romponents of the agricultural production model: annual crop 
production, perennial crop production, and livestock production 
(rudimentnay version). The annual and perennial crop sub-component 
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compute for 
three regions and 12 agricultural commodities;
output, supply, farm consumption, income, costs, 
returns to
land and labor, and seasonal labor requirements.
livestock The rudimentarysub-componer.t computes output and value added for
each of 6 livestock commodities.
 
2. An urban demand model which computes nonfarm consumer demandsfor 19 agri.ulturally-bsed comrodities and one aggregate non­food commodity as 
a function of price, income, and population.
 
3. 
A population model which projects the rural farm population and
the urban nonfarm 
.'Il-,ulation as a function of time-dependentbirthrates, C'eath racus, ar.d ,tigratiun rates. 
4. A dyna-..'c nat.crvA inpuUL/OUru t nodel which projects urban non­farm (:ro."s r roUC.L (GNP) nd
 
Certain mchi.-::. 
 f:r .iuj.n pri-f, l1,cati: areas to different 
crops, and ad.itrtitg y..:1 hxjf,'., not yet been prorramred to link the components 
outlined above. 
 (Th,-;. :';echanis:- are enclosed by doLted lines in Figure 4).
 
Therefore, in 
 making the current projections on the computer, it was necessary 
to use 
a "manual" iterative procedure to adjust yields, crop areas, and prices
 
in order to equate production with consumption and-to bring exports and imports
 
into line with current levels and reasonable projections for the future under
 
various alternatives.
 
As a result of 
this iterative procedure, projections of the following
 
(and other) variables are produced for 1975, 1980 and 1985 for the several
 
policy alternatives: farm output, consumption, farm income, farm income per

capita, farm consumed calories and protein per capita, returns to land and labor,
 
value added from agriculture, urban consumption by commodity, urban price
 
indices, ratio of urban food expenditure to total urbaa expenditure, and imports
 
and exports by commodity.
 
Figure 4 is an oversimplified version of several hundred equations which
 
express the relationships being modeled 
.n 
quantitative form for computing
 
purposes.
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Development of KASS Model
 
Korean administrators are seeking so many different goods and avoiding
 
so many different bads in developing their Pgr!culture that it is very difficult
 
for them or anyone to find a com.on denominator for a maximizing model. Con­
sider, for instance, the goods of (1) adequate food, (2)political stability,
 
(3) off-farm migrants to develop industry, and (4) education. Also consider the 
bads of (1) unequal ilCoMLs between farm and urban people, (2) dependence on 
food imports, (3) water and air pollution, (4) urban slums, (5) destructive 
revolution, (6) manlauri.tir., (7) illiteracy, etc. ihlio can determine, before 
analysis, a comtion uaelga num2:ator diverent and bads? howsuch goods And can 
one be sure that the 6amages ir.p0,,d on some by unequal agricultural growth 
are greater or lesser than benefits conferred cn ,)thers? r. know ahead ofIhNo 

time the best order in which to execute the projects within a program, and the
 
programs within a policy? And, if knowledge is uncertain, how can one know
 
whether decision making should be cautious or chance taking?
 
Because of such complex questions, the KASS team preferred, initially at
 
least, to use general models to project the consequences of following alter­
native courses of action--in terms of several goods attained and bads incurred.
 
In Figure 3, these variables are indicated in the lower right hand corner as
 
performance variables and in Figure 4, as criteria. The KASS group views itself
 
as assisting public decision makers by (1) making projections of such variables
 
available, and (2) helping to reach prescriptive decisions as to the right actiot
 
to tak,, concerning policies and progranm. The KASS approach is general with 
respect to the use or novuse of maximizing models. 
It is also general with respect to sources of data and techniques, as it 
accepts data and information from miny sources, that is, time series, carefully 
controlled experiin, ts, the normative and non-normative judgments of informed 
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men, survey data, and opinions, etc.
 
The KASS appro-ich is designed to trace the consequences of alternative
 
courses of action throu ,h time. Therefore, it can be viewed as capable of
 
simulating the periurn,-nce of Korean agriculture under Alternative Policy
 
Strategy sets. It is this ability to trace consequences through time which
 
makes it a simulation approach. Simple planning and budgeting models employed
 
long before the existence of !ven simple mechani.eal desk calculators were
 
simulation approaches. H1istorically, such approaches atttained and maintained
 
high credibility in.)ong both public and pri.'te decision makers. It is a mistake
 
to assume th2.o cn ' c i td alroaclh can be a si nulation approach and that
 
all simulation r ed;ii a:. computeri.zed. To do so is to Ignore some of the most
 
effective simulatfcii ,-ork done ud most of the actual. basis for private and
 
public decision iaV-ing. 
The model war constructed so that it could be computerized. Personnel,
 
time and costs can be reduced several fold by usingt electronic computers.-/
 
The KASS model is also a systems model in which the Korean agricultural sector is
 
viewed as a system trade up of sub-systems, and which Is itself a sub-system of a
 
still largar system, the nati,ial economy of Korea. Fortunately, the Korean
 
national economy is modeled in a general way so that the more detailed KASS agri­
cultural model can relate agriculture to the rest of the economy. When and if
 
a general systems simulation mcdel of the nonagricultural Eector of Korea is devel­
oped in the detail being created for agriculture, it will be easier to study more
 
fully the farm/nonfarmn interactions for the entire Korean econoay.
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